

The Possibility of Resistance within The Rhizomatics of Cyberspace:

William Gibson's *Neuromancer*

Abstract: In his “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” Deleuze introduces contemporary society as a control society, delineating it as a rhizomatic one which, by its very nature, trespasses national boundaries, attains a global dimension and develops a new mechanism of control. As opposed to the strict striations of disciplinary societies, for Deleuze, control society is characterized by its smooth spaces that allow for the endless circulation and flexibility of capital, control, information and production. The rhizomatic and machinic aspect of control society resonates with the contemporary theories of cyberspace, particularly that of William Gibson, who introduced the term in his novel *Neuromancer* (1984). For Gibson, cyberspace is a virtual domain or a non-space where the taken-for-granted limits of materiality and the body are transcended. In Deleuzian philosophy, likewise, cyberspace is a disembodied space that has no fixed organizing principle but a molecular plane of disorganization that frequently meets the moments of reterritorialization aimed at molar organizations. In both cases, cyberspace corresponds to a space which can smooth over the social striations and ontological boundaries, and offer the dynamism of becoming instead of Being and the disorganization of body without organs instead of body as organism. In this regard, this article addresses the possible affinity between Deleuze and Gibson’s conceptual constellations of cyberspace, and discusses the implications of resistance within the rhizomatics of cyberspace in light of Deleuzian philosophy.

Keywords: cyberspace, smooth space, deterritorialization, resistance, rhizome, late capitalism

In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Gilles Deleuze argues that the question of “against whom or against what” determines a philosopher’s or an artist’s position in life (8). Accordingly, his answer to this question brings Deleuze to a common ground with William Gibson, where they both write *against* late capitalism and its alliance with science and technology, and where they both develop their conceptions of cyberspace in line with their critical stance. Much ink has been spilt so far on

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the definition and scope of cyberspace, exploring Gibson's understanding of cyberspace either to provide a historical trajectory of the coinage or to relate it to postmodernist social theories. Fredric Jameson, for instance, has scrutinized Gibson's novel *Neuromancer* as a postmodernist text which, for him, "afford[s] us some glimpse into a postmodern or technological sublime" (37). David Brande, on the other hand, has examined his text as a manifestation of the "fantasies" and "the internal contradictions of capitalism" (536). Another critic Phillip Schweighauser has embraced Jameson's reflections on Gibson's text and yet brought a novel insight by calling its genre a dystopia and cyberspace a "dystopian space" (225). Among these, however, none has critically engaged with Gibson's understanding of cyberspace from a Deleuzian perspective although his text is remarkably rich in its implications and projections about the contemporary world under late capitalism, which would necessarily position him alongside Deleuze and Guattari. In this regard, this article aims to address the possible affinities and differences between Deleuze's and Gibson's conceptual constellations of cyberspace and their implications about the contemporary world, and to elucidate the subversive potentials within the rhizomatics of cyberspace. More specifically, this article entails reading Gibson's *Neuromancer* by interrogating some of the sociopolitical and conceptual links between cyberspace and late capitalism from a Deleuzian lens.

Deleuze himself is not actually a cyber-theorist but a great observer of the contemporary world, whose work provides us with ideas that can correspond to a cyber theory. One such idea is that there has been a paradigm shift in the form and nature of power and social organization. He draws a close link between this paradigm shift and late capitalism. In his groundbreaking co-authored books on capitalism and schizophrenia, *Anti-Oedipus* (1972) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), he portrays a new form of capitalism that is no longer under the rule of nation-states but in the hands of multinational corporations. He perceives it as an axiomatic and immanent social

machine that goes beyond national boundaries, attains a transnational dimension and reigns the whole global sphere. The *immanence* that hallmarks late capitalism is, for Deleuze, defined uniquely by longitudes, latitudes, speeds and multiplicities rather than forms, structures and hierarchies (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* 235-237). That is, it constitutes an alternative to the idea of transcendence where a center organizes, binarizes and immobilizes entities, objects and their relations. Late capitalism no longer requires a transcendent center that creates fixed subjectifications and significations, but rather resides on a plane of immanence that cuts across all the stable forms and organizations, dismantles previously-established binaries and hierarchical relations, and brings everything, even the center itself, into a slippery ground only to maintain the constant flow of capital. Therefore, it works through a kind of axiomatics, which is a constant act of deterritorialization and reterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* 153; 238). For the axiomatic of late capitalism operates through the principle of fluidity and mobility, it perpetually needs to purify existing codifications or stratifications on its flow. This is primarily because the previous codifications and stratifications function as transcendent anchor points which block the gates for free flow and new productive activities. The reason for decoding them is then to enable a free flow where capitalist production becomes possible. In late capitalism, thus, a single organizing principle is necessarily replaced by a constant act of decoding and recoding. This axiomatic renders the ever-changing, ever-increasing and ever-growing production possible as a result of both its potential to decode and recode and its collaboration with digital technologies that would enable and accelerate the circulation of capital. It is thanks to digital technologies that capitalism now has an incessant cybernetic mechanism of production and control. In other words, digital technologies have become the new medium of late capitalism to pursue its all-encompassing control over the world economy, global society, and individuals.

Deleuze and Guattari's observation of the changing dynamics in the structure of the world economy, politics, and society suggests that there is an obvious correlation between cyberspace and late capitalism. Likewise, William Gibson's novel *Neuromancer* (1984) testifies that this correlation is indeed realized not merely by philosophers and sociologists of the age but also by contemporaneous science-fiction writers. In the novel, Gibson depicts a new world order where transnational corporations like Biolabs GmbH, Tessier-Ashpool, Yakuza and Hosaka begin to dominate the world, trespassing the limits of nation-states, and where information becomes the new capital. As the novel states: "Power, in Case's world, meant corporate power. The zaibatsus, the multinationals that shaped the course of human history, had transcended old barriers. Viewed as organisms, they had attained a kind of immortality. You couldn't kill a zaibatsu by assassinating a dozen key executives; there were others waiting to step up the ladder, assume the vacated position, access the vast banks of corporate memory" (*Neuromancer* 203). In this fictional world under the control of corporations, power attains an abstract and gaseous nature, flowing in infinite directions and establishing rhizomatic networks of relations. To put it succinctly, power becomes invisible and yet much more effective than ever.

This change in the power structure and the social formation depicted in *Neuromancer* strongly resonates with what Deleuze observes and describes in his 1992 "Postscript on the Societies of Control." As Deleuze clarifies in his brief essay, the contemporary world has undergone a significant transition from disciplinary nation-states to global societies of control. With the rapid globalization and developments in digital technologies, power previously exercised through disciplinary institutions has now entered into a sophisticated network of control. Deleuze tends to associate this previous hegemonic form of power with the disciplinary societies that were in dominance from the eighteenth to the last quarter of the twentieth century. In these societies,

there was a static relationship between power and the individual; to be more precise, a sovereign source of power had all the means of constraining the society and the individual. These societies were highly striated through regulatory institutions such as schools, hospitals, families, and factories. As Deleuze suggests, spaces of *enclosures* constituted the backbone of these societies where power belonged to a single center and organized systems around it by drawing strict boundaries, confining and regulating (“Postscript” 4). In the societies of control, however, social organizations gradually cease to be disciplinary; they rather operate through free-floating flows of control. In other words, the principles of discipline and confinement are gradually replaced by a mechanism of control under the illusion of freedom, and the striated social milieu is replaced by smooth spaces. Deleuze clarifies the close links between this shift in social structure and digital technology as follows:

The old societies of sovereignty made use of simple machines—levers, pulleys, clocks; but the recent disciplinary societies equipped themselves with machines involving energy, with the passive danger of entropy and the active danger of sabotage; the societies of control operate with machines of a third type, computers, whose passive danger is jamming and whose active one is piracy or the introduction of viruses. This technological evolution must be, even more profoundly, a mutation of capitalism. (“Postscript” 6).

In Gibson’s *Neuromancer*, it cannot be argued that transcendent walls of disciplinary institutions have been entirely collapsed, since a gradual shift from disciplinary mode to control mode is still observed in the society he depicts. The mutation of capitalism that comes along with this gradual shift corresponds to the emergence of what Gibson calls “cyberspace.” In the novel,

cyberspace is defined as “a consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation...A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data” (51). This is tantamount to saying that it is the sum of a vast informational network, a disembodied space one could jack in and move in infinite directions at different speeds, different longitudes and latitudes. This definition of cyberspace as non-space could be associated with Deleuzian notion of “smooth space” (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 474). Smooth space is of a rhizomatic nature, having no particular beginning or end, but multifarious lines heading for no specific goal (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 371; 478). The cyberspace that Case, the cyberspace cowboy, desires to jack in, is as such an unbound system in which movement is no longer forwarding towards a point of arrival, and where what actually matters is not destination but movement itself. Cyberspace has an open system that makes it both connectable in all dimensions and at the same time detachable and apt for modification and modulation. Accordingly, as seen in the novel, it has multiple entryways where several networks can be simultaneously established, rhizomatically expanded. In this sense, cyberspace itself is a zone of multiplicity where lines and movements perpetually undergo transformation.

With the rhizomatic and mobile nature of cyberspace in mind, it would not be wrong to say that the ideology behind cyberspace is not very different from the logic of late capitalism. What constitutes the core of cyberspace and late capitalism and turns both into smooth spaces of infinite network of social relations is the act of deterritorialization. Deterritorialization is a term that was first introduced by Deleuze and Guattari in their co-authored work *Anti-Oedipus* (1972) to delineate how late capitalism works. They define deterritorialization as a “decoding of flows”

(222), a movement of “coming undone” (367), and “a line of escape by which it escapes itself and makes its enunciations or its expressions take flight and disarticulate” (*Kafka* 86). It is simply a process of removing all the previously-existing codes, rules and laws to pave the way for the creation of new ones. Put succinctly, it is an act of reverting any fixed and immobile site into a site of potentiality. Although the act of deterritorialization seems to be quite liberating in that it opens up new possibilities, it is indeed a genuinely capitalist tool. It helps the constant circulation of capital by allowing it to perpetually mutate. In this sense, deterritorialization forms the very logic of late capitalism that relies and operates on a space of constant variation and movement. The same logic governs cyberspace as well. Cyberspace is a space where there are no permanent foundations to hold on to other than pure mobility, and this mobility could only be achieved by the act of deterritorialization. It is then this capitalist act that smooths over all the fixations and foundations, enables infinite movement and dynamism and creates cyberspace in the first place. In this regard, it is not surprising to understand why Bill Gates sees cyberspace as the space of what he calls “frictionless capitalism,” i.e. late capitalism (157).

Neuromancer's fictional world sheds light upon the intricate relations between cyberspace and frictionless capitalism. Gibson draws a new global world order where the multinational corporations have controlling power not merely over the social trajectory and political relations but also over cyberspace. Since it is these corporations that literally own cyberspace and could decide who could access and leap into it, it functions as a medium used to maintain or even multiply their business interests in the global sphere. Cyberspace is, in this sense, a metonymic embodiment of the immanent workings of late capitalism, depicting the very structure of the contemporary world where everything is in an intricate network of relations and all these relations somehow serve the good of the corporate powers. It is an infinite space where capital is no longer

under the monopoly of the nation-states but continually keeps changing form and expanding in all directions. In this sense, Gibson's fictional portrayal of cyberspace becomes almost a tangible reality and a genuine experience of the late capitalist system.

Apparently, the act of deterritorialization inherent to cyberspace is what makes capitalism frictionless, rhizomatic, and all encompassing. Yet this capitalist act could very well be turned against itself and provide one with the tools to survive and resist in and through cyberspace, and by extension, the late capitalist world. Deterritorialization could serve as a revolutionary tool just as smooth space could become a site of resistance. As previously discussed, the capitalist social machine deterritorializes territories only to reterritorialize them with their own novel codes. To be more precise, capitalism creates smooth spaces such as cyberspace, on which it could perpetually establish its own assemblages. This continuous act of deterritorialization and subsequent reterritorialization on smooth spaces is indeed what gives capitalism its dynamism. But whenever a smooth space is created out of deterritorializing forces, it is always necessarily prone to revolutionary creations as well as capitalist reterritorializations. This is primarily because smooth spaces are the spaces of multiple alternatives, infinite possibilities and potentialities of any kind, be it capitalist or revolutionary. Once all the blockages on territories are purged and free flow is enabled, these territories where any form of movement is now possible could simultaneously be used for revolutionary purposes. In such cases, deterritorializing activity simultaneously becomes a revolutionary activity to draw a line of flight from capitalist ends rather than a capitalist activity to actualize these ends.

As Deleuze and Guattari point out in *Thousand Plateaus*, however, it is important to know that smooth spaces and striated spaces “in fact exist only in mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space” (474). This to say that smooth spaces are

necessarily in danger of striation and capture. The risk of striation is even more likely in the societies of control where media and digital technology become the new mechanism of control. To give an example, in *Neuromancer* Gibson reveals to us how smooth space has been captured and colonized by multinational corporations. The access to and movement within cyberspace, namely cyberspace's affirmative flexibility, are limited and controlled by the striating forces of corporate power. Yet it cannot still be claimed that these corporations' control entirely eliminates the possibility of resistance and liberation manifesting within cyberspace. On the contrary, no matter how they determine who can jack in which entryway, the smooth space of cyberworld is, by its very nature, susceptible to transgression. Thus, the striations of these corporations on cyberspace are always open to be reversed and cyberspace to be returned to a smooth space as a form of resistance to late capitalism.

The potential of cyberspace as a revolutionary tool could be closely traced through the cyber cowboy Case. Case serves as a significant character that uses the power of cyberspace against its holders. Although access to cyberspace is controlled by multinational corporations for their own purposes, Case, who is hired to sneak into rival corporations' systems to damage, discard or corrupt data, trespasses his own corporation's system and steals from his employers. Case is apparently one of the victims of the corporate capitalist system, which perpetually increases the gap between rich and poor, and the primary reason behind hacking his own bosses is to pay his debts. In this sense, Case's act of penetrating into the information flows of his own corporation designates an act of subverting existing power structures that condemn many like him to the bottom of the social hierarchy. The idea of resistance hereby could be associated with a necessity of destruction. As Antonio Negri shows, an affirmative social movement necessarily depends upon an act of destruction (114-121). What is meant by destruction is, however, not literal destruction

but a deterritorialization of the striated spaces created by corporate capitalism, an annihilation of the blockages and stable forms on the flow of life. Digital technologies which are often designed for corporate interests, at this point, could pave the way for the creation of new forms of resistance complying with the changing dynamics in the new socio-economic and political structure. In the societies of control where information becomes the new capital, one of these new forms of resistance is free access to information and its use and abuse against corporate interests. As such, what Case steals in cyberspace is not money but information which is the most valuable asset of the new age:

Case was twenty-four. At twenty-two, he'd been a cowboy, a rustler, one of the best in the Sprawl. He'd been trained by the best, by McCoy Pauley and Bobby Quine, legends in the biz. He'd operated on an almost permanent adrenaline high, a byproduct of youth and proficiency, jacked into a custom cyberspace deck that projected his disembodied consciousness into the consensual hallucination that was the matrix. A thief, he'd worked for other, wealthier thieves, employers who provided the exotic software required to penetrate the bright walls of corporate systems, opening windows into rich fields of data. He'd made the classic mistake, the one he'd sworn he'd never make. He stole from his employers. He kept something for himself. (*Neuromancer* 11-12)

As stated in the novel, multinational corporations are not those that could produce, sell or exchange commodities, but those that could reach the information grids since information is more valuable and commodifiable than anything. These corporations are the wealthiest thieves not because they

steal money or commodity from other corporations but because they have access to digital technologies to take the helm of cyberspace. To be more precise, they are only as powerful and wealthy as they can control cyberspace, since anything can become and function as capital in cyberspace. Cyberspace allows for a perpetual flow of capital, for it constitutes a molecular plane of disorganization where there is always a dynamism and oscillation between the acts of deterritorialization and the acts of reterritorialization, which is the source of all production. This simultaneously makes cyberspace apt for subversive and revolutionary activities just as Case's. Anything that previously serves for corporate interests could very well serve for revolutionary ends in the disembodied space of cyberspace.

Arguing against the revolutionary potential of Gibson's cyberspace, several critics such as Ella Briens, John Marks, and Tim Jordan characterize the disembodiment of cyberspace as "a desire for transcendence" (Briens 122; Marks 197; Jordan 187). According to these critics, it is true that Gibson underlines "the bodiless exultation of cyberspace" (*Neuromancer* 6), where individuals transcend the limits of the materiality of their bodies in order to work in cyberspace. These critics perceive this as a fall into the trap of Cartesian dualism between body and mind, considering that "'cyber' technologies will finally allow human beings to become 'pure' intelligence, no longer hindered by the needs and demands of the body" (Briens 118). This article agrees with some of these arguments, in the sense that Gibson's cyber discourse has a problematic position, particularly when it is interpreted from a critical stance that does not take the socio-political context into account. Yet there is a crucial point that escapes their notice and still should be underlined. As stated earlier, the fictional world in *Neuromancer* is in a transition process from disciplinary mode into control mode as a result of advanced developments in digital technology. Although this new global world is now organized and controlled through *machines of a third type*,

namely, computers, viruses, and hacking systems, there is still a degree of disciplinary regulation strongly felt throughout the novel. In disciplinary regulation, Foucault argues, power is exercised on the body. There, the body functions as a site of subjugation because order is maintained only through the production of “docile bodies,” passive, repressed and enslaved bodies. As Foucault remarks, power works “to discipline the body, optimise its capabilities, extort its forces, increase its usefulness and docility, integrate it into systems of efficient and economic controls” (139). In a Deleuzian context, this would mean that the body is stripped of all its intensities and turned into an organism each part of which does its assigned function.

Corporate power’s use and abuse of the body is most obvious through the characterization of Molly and Case: Molly’s body is developed and enriched through a series of surgeries to increase her fighting skills so that she might better serve the corporations she is affiliated with. Her body is organized and manipulated in line with corporate interests. Likewise, when it is discovered that Case has stolen from the corporation he works for, they strip his body of all its abilities to jack in and damage his nervous system as a punishment. It is through the modifications that they implement on his body that he becomes unable to use his ability to enter cyberspace. In a very similar fashion, his body undergoes several other modifications in order to retrieve his talent as a rival company led by Armitage that wants to hire Case repairs his body:

‘Good, because you have a new one [dependency].’

‘How’s that?’ Case looked up from his coffee. Armitage was smiling.

‘You have fifteen toxin sacs bonded to the lining of various main arteries, Case. They’re dissolving. Very slowly, but they definitely are dissolving. Each one contains a mycotoxin.’

You're already familiar with the effect of that mycotoxin. It was the one your former employers gave you in Memphis.'

Case blinked up at the smiling mask.

'You have time to do what I'm hiring you for, Case, but that's all. Do the job and I can inject you with an enzyme that will dissolve the bond without opening the sacs.

Then you'll need a blood change. Otherwise, the sacs melt and you're back where I found you. So you see, Case, you need us. You need us as badly as you did when we scraped you up from the gutter.' (*Neuromancer* 39)

This new corporation retrieves his talent only to use Case for their own ends by replacing his fluid, changing his blood, inserting a new pancreas into his body, and patching some new tissues into his liver. But the enzymes implanted into his body make him contingent on this new company for his own survival. In each case, then, Case's body becomes a site of control and subjugation: it functions both as a space for the creation of molar assemblages and as a space for the formation of his submissive subjectivity in line with corporate interests.

In this regard, although it cannot be denied that there is a degree of hierarchy established between body and mind and a desire to escape the body, it is also necessary to note that the idea behind this desire to escape the body is not necessarily transcendent. The body in *Neuromancer* is apparently an embodiment of molar organizations; it is an organism that is used and abused for capitalist ends. Thus, the desire to escape the body could be regarded not as a desire to escape the body's materiality or its affirmative forces but as a desire to escape from the organism of the body towards a body without organs, a body of cyberspace, from the molar organizations of the corporate system towards the molecular possibilities of cyberspace. This is mainly because, as

opposed to the plane of organization represented by corporations where molecules, bodies, flows of life and flows of desire are organized, stifled and stratified into fixed and molar lines, cyberspace stands for the plane of consistency where continuums of forces and intensities could always be reactivated and put back into play, and bodies, the flow of life and desire could always break free from their thickenings. In this sense, it is hard to say that the body's materiality is entirely and intentionally missing in cyberspace. On the contrary, despite the supposed hierarchy that locates mind over body and relates cyberspace only to the realm of the mind, cyberspace indeed allows for a degree of unity of body and mind.

Accordingly, in *Neuromancer*, cyberspace subverts the long-established boundaries built around selves and bodies. The self is no longer unified and the body is no longer imprisoned or strictly separated from the mind. This is most felt in Case's experience of some other bodies from within. In cyberspace, he experiences the physical pain of Molly's body when she breaks her leg as he connects to her sensorium. He is even able to see from someone else's perspective, literally through the eyes of a different person: "[He] found himself staring down, through Molly's one good eye, at a white-faced, wasted figure, afloat in a loose fetal crouch, a cyberspace deck between its thighs, a band of silver trades above closed, shadowed eyes. The man's cheeks were hollowed with a day's growth of dark beard, his face slick with sweat. He was looking at himself" (256). This switch to Molly's perspective is of great significance, first in the sense that it pushes the limits of bodily experience. This can be seen as the "virtualization of the body," in Pierre Levy's words, which is the creation of a hybrid, social and "technobiological hyperbodies." For Levy, "the virtualization of the body is therefore not a form of disembodiment but a re-creation, a reincarnation, a multiplication, vectorization, and heterogenesis of the human" (44). In other words, the body escapes itself and attains a new multiplicity by pushing its limits to the point of

rupture. Accordingly, Molly and Case's bodies are indeed reterritorialized from their individual bodies and establish a new and subversive network of relations. Secondly, this switch is quite revealing in the sense that it subverts gender boundaries and allows the subject to move from the fixed position of "Being" into the slippery ground of Becoming, or into the realm of what Deleuze calls "becoming-other" than-himself.

With his switch between himself and Molly, Case occupies not merely two different perspectives but also two different bodies simultaneously, one his own and the other a woman's body. Cyberspace as a smooth space of potentialities and possibilities in this sense paves the way for a revolutionary existence by reterritorializing the assumed definitions of self, body and mind. It puts everything fixed onto a slippery ground. The subjects become fluid with existing boundaries, moving from place to place, from body to body and establishing a new set of relations in each new movement. As seen in Case's integration of his body and mind and his switch between bodies, each movement is productive of subversive becomings, suggesting that cyberspace could break free from rigid heteronormative subjectivities.

In Gibson's cyberworld, it is not only the boundaries between body and mind, self and other that could be transgressed. In line with the subversive tendency inherent to cyberspace, the boundaries between human and machine are also seen to have been blurred in the novel. These blurring boundaries are first felt in the portrayal of Wintermute in the novel. Wintermute is an artificial intelligence built by the Tessier-Ashpool company that can record one's consciousness, memories and ideas, take on different forms, roles, speech patterns and behaviors. As such, it is the one that controls, conditions and manipulates Case's mind to make him act in line with Armigate's plan. Yet Wintermute is not a unified entity. It is only one half of AI, just like one lobe of human brain, mastered in logical decisions and strategical planning. It does not have its own

personality. Neuromancer is, however, the other half of Wintermute, having a personality of its own. Wintermute and Neuromancer are like two sides of the same coin, the former representing the mind and the latter representing the body. However, the problem is that they are separated. Thus, just as Case strives to have full command of his body and mind simultaneously, Wintermute strives to merge with Neuromancer to go beyond his simply machinic existence and take full command of itself. The whole plot of *Neuromancer*, as such, revolves around its struggle to reach a full consciousness, break free from human control and become autonomous. To put it another way, it purports to go beyond the binary between mind and body, human and machine, just like all the other characters. It also seems to have partially achieved this goal since it is no longer simply a machine-like entity but a kind of becoming that bears emotions, drives and pursues personal goals at the end of the novel.

These in-between entities, becomings or cyborg personalities are indeed quite revealing in the sense that cyberspace is a site which enables resistance against the old dualisms of Western thought, and their molar manifestations in terms of space and subjectivity. It is here that temporal, spatial and ontological barriers are collapsed and new possibilities emerge. Although it is almost always prone to being striated and becoming a tool in contemporary societies of control, it still designates a space of flows and intensities and a space of liberation. Gibson's conception of cyberspace, despite being interpreted by some critics as a transcendent tendency, stands as a significant model that not only recognizes the changing dynamics of the newly emerging societies of control and their alliance with digital technology, but also bears witness to the existence of numerous possibilities of liberation from the capture of these new means of control.

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